Vol. I · No. 46The protocol sectionSat, 10 Oct 2026
Layer 7 · Management · every device’s log, in one place

Syslog

Event logging

Syslog is the oldest and most universal way to say what just happened. A device emits a one-line message tagged with a facility and a severity, and ships it to a central collector — so that the evidence lives somewhere the compromised machine cannot reach.

Syslog sends one line per event, tagged by facility and severity, to a collector — off the box, where it can still be trusted.

Operates at
Layer 7
one line per event
Ports
514 · 6514
UDP/TCP · TLS
Severity
0 – 7
emergency to debug
Modern form
RFC 5424
structured data

How it works

What a single log line actually contains
An RFC 5424 message, field by field
<34>
1
2026-08-14T21:04:11Z
fw-edge-01
sshd
4021
MSGID
[origin ip="203.0.113.9"] structured data
Failed password for invalid user admin from 203.0.113.9

The leading priority packs two numbers into one: facility × 8 + severity. <34> is facility 4 (auth) at severity 2 (critical) — which is how a collector routes and alerts before it has parsed a word of the message.

The main points

What Syslog does, step by step

1
Tag the event

The program picks a facility — auth, mail, kern, local0–7 — and a severity from 0 to 7.

2
Format the line

Priority, timestamp, hostname, application and the message itself; RFC 5424 adds structured key/value data.

3
Ship it off the box

Sent to a collector over UDP, TCP or TLS — so it survives the machine that produced it.

4
Filter, store, alert

The collector routes by facility and severity into storage, and raises alerts on what matters.

The severities
0 – 1 — emergency, alert — wake someone
2 – 3 — critical, error — act today
4 – 5 — warning, notice — worth reading
6 – 7 — info, debug — volume lives here
Facilities — auth, kern, mail, daemon, local0–7
RFC 5424 — structured data, proper timestamps

In cybersecurity

Logs are the evidence an investigation depends on — which makes them the first thing an intruder edits, and why plain UDP syslog can be both forged and silently dropped.

Ship them off the host

A local log on a compromised box is worth little; a copy on a collector is what survives.

UDP loses messages

No delivery guarantee at all — under load or attack, the interesting lines are the ones that vanish.

Forgery is trivial

Anything can send a syslog packet claiming any hostname; use TLS on 6514 to authenticate senders.

No confidentiality

Messages routinely contain usernames, IPs and paths, in clear text over the network by default.

Clocks must agree

Correlating events across devices is impossible if their timestamps disagree — NTP first.

Retention and integrity

Write-once storage and defined retention are what make logs admissible rather than merely present.

Rides in the stack

IPUDP / TCP / TLSSyslog

UDP 514 is the traditional default and the least reliable; TCP keeps the messages, and TLS on 6514 also proves who sent them.

Works with

SNMPNTP

See it on Linux

journalctl

Severities & transports

Severity
0 emergsystem unusable
2 critcritical
4 warningworth a look
7 debugnoise, mostly
Transports
514/udplossy default
514/tcpreliable
6514/tlsauthenticated
RELPguaranteed