Vol. I · No. 46The protocol sectionSat, 10 Oct 2026
Layer 7 · AAA · may this device onto the network at all?

RADIUS

Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service

RADIUS answers the question asked before any traffic is allowed. A switch, Wi-Fi controller or VPN forwards a joining device’s credentials to a central server, which replies accept or reject — often with a VLAN to put them on — and then logs the whole session for accounting.

RADIUS centralises authentication, authorisation and accounting for network access — the switch asks, the server decides.

Answers
AAA
authn, authz, accounting
Ports
1812 · 1813
auth · accounting
Transport
UDP
with its own retries
Carried by
802.1X
EAP over the LAN

How it works

Three parties: the device, the switch, and the server
Supplicant
the laptop or phone
EAP over LAN
Authenticator
switch, AP or VPN
no decision of its own
RADIUS · 1812
RADIUS server
checks the directory
Access-Request

The authenticator forwards the identity and credentials it was given, with the port it arrived on.

Access-Accept

The reply may also carry attributes — a VLAN, an ACL, a session timeout to enforce.

Accounting

Start, interim and stop records on 1813 record who was on, for how long, and how much they moved.

The switch is a relay, not a judge — it holds the port closed until the server says otherwise. That is what makes one policy apply across every access point and every switch at once.

The main points

What RADIUS does, step by step

1
The port stays shut

With 802.1X, a switch port passes nothing but EAP until the device has authenticated.

2
Forward as Access-Request

The authenticator wraps the credentials in RADIUS and sends them to the server on 1812.

3
Accept, reject or challenge

The server checks the directory and answers — often adding the VLAN or ACL to apply.

4
Account for the session

Start and stop records on 1813 give a complete picture of who was connected, and when.

What it is used for
802.1X wired — authenticate before the port opens
WPA2/3-Enterprise — per-user Wi-Fi, no shared key
VPN access — the gateway asks RADIUS
Dynamic VLAN — the reply chooses the network
CoA — change or kill a live session
Admin login — router and switch management

In cybersecurity

RADIUS is old enough that its packet protection is a shared secret and MD5 — modern deployments must tunnel it, or rely on EAP to protect what actually matters.

Weak by design

Only the password attribute is obscured, using MD5 with the shared secret — the rest is plaintext.

BlastRADIUS

CVE-2024-3596 forges responses via MD5 collisions; Message-Authenticator must be required.

Strong shared secrets

Long and unique per client — a reused secret compromises every device that has it.

Use EAP-TLS

Certificate-based EAP means no password is exposed even if RADIUS itself is observed.

RadSec

RADIUS over TLS on 2083 fixes the transport properly; use it wherever both ends support it.

Validate the server cert

Clients that don’t check it will hand credentials to any evil-twin AP that asks.

Rides in the stack

IPUDPRADIUScarries EAP

UDP with application-level retries — and RadSec now offers the same protocol over TLS on TCP 2083.

Works with

LDAPKerberos

RADIUS or TACACS+?

RADIUSTACACS+
TransportUDPTCP 49
EncryptsThe passwordThe whole body
AAACombinedSeparated
Typical useNetwork accessDevice admin